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1.  INTRODUCTION
The planets of the solar system started out as clumps of 
material, so-called planetesimals, with diameters of around 
1–100 km, which grew by accreting particles and small bod-
ies from the cloud of gas and dust that surrounded the newly 
formed Sun. Some planetesimals enjoyed rapid growth and 
quickly developed significant gravitational fields, thereby 
attracting and absorbing more and more small bodies to 
become fully fledged planets. Others were destroyed in 
violent collisions that produced clouds of fragments. A large 
fraction of the asteroids present in the solar system today are 
collisional fragments, orbiting the Sun in the main asteroid 
belt between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. As a result of 
gradual orbital evolution due to the recoil effect of thermal 
radiation emission (the Yarkovsky effect; see the chapter 
by Vokrouhlicky et al. in this volume) and perturbations by 
large planets, primarily Jupiter, there is a continual leakage 
of asteroids from the main belt into the inner solar system. 
The resulting populations of so-called Mars crossers and 
near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) have orbits that give rise to oc-
casional collisions with the terrestrial planets. The orbits of 
periodic comets can also evolve to cross Earth’s orbit. The 
population of near-Earth objects (NEOs, a term embracing 
both asteroids and comets) contains a wide variety of bod-
ies with diverse physical and dynamical properties (see the 
chapter by Jedicke et al. in this volume), and presents a 
permanent threat to our civilization and a serious challenge 
to those involved in developing mitigation strategies. While 
the term “NEO” is often used in texts on the impact hazard, 
comets are much less numerous than asteroids in Earth’s 
neighborhood and represent only a minor fraction of potential 
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of which the next major impactor is most likely to be a member. The Chelyabinsk event has 
reminded us that objects as small as 20 m, about which we know very little, impact frequently 
and are a serious threat to life and property. Political awareness and international response efforts 
are still at a very primitive stage. For a global guarantee of protection, advances in scientific 
and technical competence must be matched by improvements in international coordination, as 
well as preparedness at the political level.
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impactors. In this chapter we use the term “NEA” when 
referring primarily to the asteroid component of the NEO 
population (e.g., in discussions of population statistics and 
deflection techniques).
Awareness of the threat presented by NEOs has grown 
rapidly during the past few decades as a result of, for example, 
the first observation in real time of a large-scale impact on a 
planet, i.e., the impact of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 on Jupiter 
in 1994 (e.g., see Noll et al., 1996); observations of fresh 
craters appearing on the Moon and Mars (e.g., Buratti and 
Johnson, 2003; Malin et al., 2006); the discovery, with search 
programs of ever-increasing sophistication, of thousands of 
NEOs, some of which make uncomfortably close approaches 
to Earth; and the realization that the Tunguska event of 1908 
was not a freak phenomenon after the blast waves from the 
Chelyabinsk superbolide of February 15, 2013, injured some 
1500 people and damaged thousands of buildings (Popova et 
al., 2013) (see section 2). The rather unsettling coincidence 
of the anticipated close approach at an altitude of only 
28,000 km on that very same day of (367943) Duende (known 
at the time by its provisional designation of 2012 DA14), an 
asteroid with an extent of about 20 × 40 m unrelated to the 
Chelyabinsk object, ensured that asteroids made the headlines 
in most major news media at the time.
While this chapter concentrates on developments since 
the publication of Asteroids III, readers interested in earlier 
developments in this field are referred to, e.g., Chapman and 
Morrison (1994), Toon et al. (1997), and the books edited 
by Gehrels (1994), Belton et al. (2004), and Bobrowsky and 
Rickman (2007). In nearly all aspects of the impact hazard 
there have been major advances since the publication of 
the predecessor chapter to this one (Morrison et al., 2002) 
in Asteroids III. In terms of our knowledge of the threat, 
the number of NEAs of all sizes discovered has risen from 
around 2000 at the end of 2002 to some 11,000 at the time 
of this writing (section 3). Surveys carried out by spacebased 
infrared telescopes, such as the Wide-Field Infrared Survey 
Explorer (WISE) (Wright et al., 2010) and the Spitzer Space 
Telescope (Werner et al., 2004), have provided diameters and 
albedos for many hundreds of NEAs, in contrast to the few 
tens of NEAs for which this information was available in 
2002 (see section 5 and the chapter by Mainzer et al. in this 
volume). There has been a significant increase in efforts by 
observers and modelers to physically characterize the NEA 
population in terms of spin vectors, taxonomy, thermal prop-
erties, binarity, shape, surface structure, etc., and investigate 
properties particularly relevant to deflection considerations, 
such as porosity and internal structure, although these efforts 
have not kept pace with the dramatic increase in the discovery 
rate. Three NEAs have been visited by spacecraft, revealing 
very different small worlds, despite similarities in taxonomic 
type. The NASA Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR)-
Shoemaker spacecraft visited the second largest NEA, 
(433) Eros, for one year starting in February 2000, revealing 
a peanut-shaped body with rich geological features such as 
large craters but a lack of small ones, boulders, “ponds,” and 
a fine regolith-covered surface (Cheng, 2002). The Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) Hayabusa space-
craft visited the small NEA (25143) Itokawa and returned a 
surface sample to Earth (Nakamura et al., 2011). Images of 
Itokawa suggest that even a body of just a few hundred meters 
in size can have a rubble-pile structure and be covered with 
large boulders and coarse regolith (Fujiwara et al., 2006; 
see also the chapter by Yoshikawa et al. in this volume). The 
Chinese Chang’e-2 lunar mission flew by (4179) Toutatis just 
800 m above its surface when Toutatis came within 18 lunar 
distances of Earth in December 2012. The images obtained 
show a contact binary NEA of 4.75 × 1.95 km and details of 
the distribution of boulders and regolith (Huang et al., 2013). 
Radar observations have provided information on the shapes 
of some NEAs passing close to Earth (see the chapter by 
Benner et al. in this volume), including small binary NEAs, 
which constitute about 15% of the NEA population.
The Chelyabinsk event (Fig. 1 and section 2) taught us 
that an Earth-bound object large enough to cause consider-
able destruction of property, if not life, can be small enough 
to escape detection, especially if its final approach is in the 
daylit sky. While new wide-field, rapid-scan telescopes are 
currently planned to detect small impactors, the days to weeks 
of warning time they might provide would be inadequate 
for any mitigation action, apart from advising the relevant 
communities, who might organize evacuation if considered 
appropriate and feasible. The size of the threatening NEO 
that will trigger the first spaceborne deflection attempt is a 
matter of debate. Due to the steep size distribution of NEOs 
there are many more small objects than large ones, and 
consequently many more sightings of fireballs than crater-
forming impacts. However, in this respect it is informative to 
compare the airburst of a stony object, such as the Tunguska 
event, which flattened 2000 km2 of forest but left no other 
obvious trace on the ground, with the impact of a similarly 
sized metallic object, which produced the 1.2-km-diameter 
Barringer Crater in Arizona. In both cases the diameter of the 
impactor is estimated to be 30–50 m. Clearly the potential 
of a threatening NEO to cause damage depends not only 
Fig. 1.  The trail left by the Chelyabinsk bolide. The left part 
of the image shows two contrarotating vortices formed by 
heating and buoyancy effects in the horizontal cylinder of 
air in which kinetic energy of the asteroid was deposited. 
Credit:  Wikimedia Commons.
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on its size but also on its composition, density, and ability 
to survive passage through the atmosphere. The asteroid 
2008 TC3 lost 99.9% of its mass during its passage through 
the atmosphere, which suggests that this meter-sized body 
probably consisted of fragile material, as well as more solid 
but weakly aggregated pieces. Nevertheless, a few hundred 
fragments with a surprising range of lithologies were recov-
ered in Sudan (see, for example, the chapters by DeMeo et al. 
and Borovička et al. in this volume). It seems that the lower 
size threshold for considering spaceborne deflection action 
should be around 30–50 m (see the discussion in section 6), 
although with current and foreseeable search programs it is 
highly unlikely that an object of this size would be detected 
far enough in advance for any deflection action to be feasible. 
At the other end of the size scale, it would seem difficult to 
justify spending taxpayers’ money at present investigating 
how to deal with an object of more than 300 m in diameter, 
given that the impact probability per year of such objects is 
estimated to be around one in 70,000. In any case, given the 
size-frequency distribution of NEOs, it is probable that we 
will gain some experience in deflecting smaller ones before 
being confronted by a large potential impactor.
Serious effort is now being spent on investigating realistic 
asteroid deflection techniques (section 4). The main contend-
ers at present are impulsive techniques, such as kinetic and 
explosive methods, and so-called “slow-push” techniques, 
such as those based on laser or ion-beam devices. The gravity 
tractor is a viable contender as a “slow-pull” technique. An 
interesting concept is the use of a slow technique directly after 
an impulsive deflection has taken place, in order to make fine 
corrections to the new orbit of the deflected NEA and provide 
some insurance against malfunction of the impulse transfer.
In recent years not only have the scientific and space-
technology communities begun to pay more attention to 
impact-hazard issues, but some national space agencies and 
international organizations are now investing significant 
funding in various endeavors, motivated by the increased 
awareness of the problem.
NASA now funds the International Astronomical Union’s 
Minor Planet Center and has recently significantly increased 
its funding of NEO search programs such as Lincoln Near 
Earth Asteroid Research (LINEAR), the Catalina Sky Survey, 
and the Panoramic Survey Telescope and Rapid Response 
System (Pan-STARRS) (see the chapter by Jedicke et al. in 
this volume). NASA also funds several groups to carry out 
research into aspects of NEA deflection options, such as 
those at Iowa State University’s Asteroid Deflection Research 
Center. In total NASA allocated about 3% of its 2013 NEO 
funding to mitigation studies. The European Space Agency 
(ESA) is currently developing a program devoted to NEO 
defense in the framework of its Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) initiative, including establishing a European NEO 
Coordination Centre. A collaborative mission concept cur-
rently under study in the U.S. and Europe is the Asteroid 
Impact and Deflection Assessment (AIDA) mission, the goal 
of which is to demonstrate the kinetic impactor concept by 
impacting the moon of a binary NEA (see section 4).
The European Commission’s Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) 
issued a call for proposals in 2010 entitled “Prevention of 
impacts from near-Earth objects on our planet.” A consortium 
of 13 partners from 6 countries, including Russia and the 
U.S., responded with a proposal for the project NEOShield 
(http://www.neoshield.net), which succeeded in gaining 
5.8 million euros of funding from January 2012 to May 2015. 
The NEOshield partners are investigating mitigation-relevant 
NEO physical properties and potential mitigation techniques 
(Harris et al., 2013). A further call for proposals for similar 
research projects was issued by the Commission in 2013; 
funding for a second phase of NEOShield, until 2017, was 
granted while this chapter was in preparation.
In a complementary initiative to those mentioned above, 
the United Nations (UN) has authorized the establishment 
of two new bodies (see section 7), the International Asteroid 
Warning Network (IAWN) and the Space Mission Planning 
Advisory Group (SMPAG).
While it seems the stage is now set for coordinated inter-
national activities in pursuit of solutions to the NEO impact 
threat, it remains to be seen if the momentum built up over 
the past few years can be maintained. The activities to be 
overseen by the IAWN and SMPAG will require significant 
and continuous funding, which will have to be made available 
by the participating countries. The recent Chelyabinsk event 
has served to focus attention on the impact hazard, but it is a 
fact of life that political interest in an area of public concern 
tends to wane if not regularly stimulated. Furthermore, we 
are still far removed from having an international agreement 
on who would do what, who would pay for what, and who 
would take responsibility for failure, in the event of a deflec-
tion action becoming necessary.
2.  THE CHELYABINSK EXPERIENCE
On February 15, 2013, at the crack of dawn, a glowing 
object appeared in the clear southeastern sky seen from the 
industrial Russian city of Chelyabinsk. As it streaked nearly 
sideways across the sky, it grew brighter until it was a blind-
ing white light that cast eerie moving shadows. It radiated 
high-intensity light for several seconds as it elongated and 
grew into a larger source, then gradually slowed, dimmed, 
and changed color from white to yellow, orange, and then 
a dull red. The sources of light continued along the original 
path as the main body stopped, forming the roiling head, 
rising like thunderclouds from a long, puffy trail that traced 
its entire path across the heavens. As residents looked on in 
wonder, the trail split neatly into two parts that seemed like 
mirror images of one another with a sharp line between them 
(Fig. 1). The columns silently drifted apart and grew upward, 
attracting early morning office workers and students to win-
dows to observe and snap photos with their smart phones.
Suddenly, just under a minute and a half after the bright-
ness of the fireball peaked, an unexpected blast wave ripped 
through the city, blowing out windows and showering spec-
tators with high-speed shards of glass and falling ceiling 
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tiles. Nobody anticipated a blast following so long after the 
spectacle in the sky, the delay being due to the time it took 
the blast wave to travel at the speed of sound some 29 km 
down to the city. Fifteen hundred people would have to be 
treated for their injuries. Out on the streets, startled residents 
screamed and shouted expletives as the concussion hit them 
and set off car alarms. After the main boom, smaller explo-
sions continued in rapid succession like artillery fire. The 
blasts lofted years of accumulated dust from old factories, 
creating a thick black pall over parts of the city as the booms 
continued. Power lines and mobile phone towers bounced 
and shook from the succession of blasts, leading to outages. 
To the south of the city, small black rocks rained down on 
villages and snow-covered fields.
Across the city and surrounding countryside, dashboard-
mounted digital cameras captured the event from every 
angle. Within minutes, computer-savvy Russians were up-
loading images and videos to the internet. The Russian media 
initially reported the event as an unidentified flying object 
(UFO), and these reports were forwarded across the world 
by users of social media. Scientists at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena first learned of the event from 
Twitter, and only because a dedicated JPL media specialist 
monitors her feed after hours. Others found out from Face-
book because a late-night chess-playing Canadian shared 
a story posted by his early morning Russian counterparts.
U.S. government satellites with instruments designed to 
detect nuclear explosions recorded the bright flash as it hap- 
pened, but did not automatically report it because it did not 
have the characteristics of a weapon. Seismometers in Russia 
recorded the shaking ground, which resembled an earthquake. 
Slower-moving low-frequency sound waves in the air (in-
frasound), which carried the first atmospheric news of the 
event, had not yet reached the western border of Russia by 
the time the international wire services picked up the story, 
albeit with sketchy anecdotal descriptions.
In the western hemisphere, most relevant experts were 
blissfully asleep, either on the U.S. east coast, where it was 
after midnight, or in pre-dawn Europe. Ironically, many were 
prepared for what was expected to be the big news event of 
the day, the close passage of asteroid (367943) Duende. With 
interviews and press conferences scheduled, they had no way 
of knowing that the Chelyabinsk event had just occurred. 
NASA does not have a system to detect atmospheric explo-
sions, and the International Monitoring System only puts out 
alerts when explosions are nuclear, so nobody’s pager went 
off. Without fortuitous social media connections, it is possible 
that officials would have been caught entirely off guard when 
asked by reporters if the Chelyabinsk event was related to 
(367943) Duende, or if NASA’s calculations were wrong.
Those who had already seen the YouTube videos knew 
immediately that this was pure coincidence. The Chelyabinsk 
asteroid came from the direction of the Sun in the northern 
hemisphere, and Duende was arriving from the southern 
nightside. Nevertheless, if a few scientists in western time 
zones hadn’t had their attention drawn to it and alerted their 
colleagues to the east, it could have created an unfortunate 
embarrassment (even though it was not NASA’s job to 
know about it, the public, media, and politicians may have 
perceived it differently).
Embarrassment, however, is not the worst-case scenario. 
If it had been cloudy in Chelyabinsk that morning, it may not 
have been immediately apparent to locals or outsiders that 
this was a cosmic airburst. The bright flash and huge blast, 
followed by the sound of heavy artillery, and parts of the city 
shrouded in dark smoke, could have been misperceived as 
an act of aggression. Snezhinsk, to the north, is the Russian 
equivalent of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 
the U.S., and the region is of nuclear strategic importance. 
Russia, unlike its neighbor Kazakhstan in the direction from 
which the asteroid came, is still a nuclear-armed state. It is 
hard to know what would happen in the heat of the moment 
when there is great uncertainty about the cause of a half-
megaton explosion over a Russian city.
If the same asteroid had come from a different direction it 
may have had far worse consequences on the ground. It was 
lucky that it arrived on a near-grazing trajectory, because its 
energy was spread out over a large distance, and was depos-
ited high enough in the atmosphere to diverge and disperse 
before it reached the ground. A steeply descending asteroid 
would explode much lower and its downward momentum 
would carry it closer to the ground, causing much more 
severe damage (Kring and Boslough, 2014). It is almost 
certain that there would have been massive casualties under 
just slightly different conditions. 
Thanks to the plethora of data collected from the dash-
board cameras, seismometers, infrasound detectors, and satel-
lites, we have a very good understanding of what happened. 
The best estimate of the kinetic yield (explosive energy) is 
400–500 kt, making Chelyabinsk the most powerful such 
event observed since the 1908 Tunguska explosion [3–5 Mt 
(Boslough and Crawford, 2008)]. Analysis of video combined 
with subsequent onsite stellar calibrations enable reliable esti-
mates of entry velocity (19 km s–1), angle (17° elevation), and 
altitude of peak brightness (29 km). This implies a preentry 
diameter of ~20 m and mass of ~12,000 t. Satellite sensors re-
corded the emission peak at 03:20:33 UT, with a total radiated 
energy of 3.75 × 1014 J (~90 kt). A typical bolide luminous 
efficiency of 20% implies a total energy of ~450 kt, consistent 
with infrasound and other observations. The maximum radiant 
intensity was 2.7 × 1013 W sr-1, corresponding to an absolute 
magnitude (referenced to a distance of 100 km) of –28, or 
more than 30× brighter than the Sun as seen by an observer 
located directly below (Brown et al., 2013).
The shallow entry angle led to a long bolide duration 
(16.5 s) and energy was deposited over hundreds of kilome-
ters, leading to an extended, near-horizontal, linear explosion. 
The blast was distributed over a large area, and was much 
weaker than it would have been in the case of a steep entry 
and a more concentrated explosion closer to the surface. The 
orientation also led to different phenomena than expected 
for a more vertical entry. There was no ballistic plume as 
observed in the case of the Shoemaker-Levy 9 impacts into 
Jupiter (45°), or calculated for Tunguska [~35° (Boslough 
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and Crawford, 1997)]. Instead, buoyant instabilities grew 
into mushroom clouds and bifurcated the trail into two con-
trarotating vortices (Kring and Boslough, 2014).
Hydrodynamic models can now be initialized with ex-
tremely accurate energy depositions at correct locations, and 
results can be compared with observations (such as timing 
and distribution of blast energy at the surface, and evolution 
of the trail) to validate the models and better understand the 
physical phenomena associated with airbursts. Models sug-
gest that airbursts are more damaging than nuclear explosions 
of the same yield (traditionally used to estimate impact risk, 
although nuclear radiation is not produced by the impact of a 
NEO). On the basis of recent observation-based size-frequen-
cy data, Chelyabinsk was estimated to be a once-per-century 
event while Tunguska was about once-per-millennium. These 
two events suggested that the size-frequency data underesti-
mated the frequency of large airbursts. However, one of us 
(Harris of MoreData! Inc.) has updated the size-frequency 
estimates and determined that Chelyabinsk is a 50-year event. 
Chelyabinsk can no longer be considered an outlier as it is 
the only observed event of its size in the last 50 years. On 
the other hand, Tunguska is now estimated to be a 500-year 
event, so its occurrence just over 100 years ago can still be 
considered a statistical outlier. The new size-frequency data 
are presented and discussed in section 3 (see also Table 1). 
The risk from airbursts is greater than previously thought, but 
still highly uncertain.
There are several approaches that can be employed to 
reduce the uncertainty in the risk, and also to reduce the 
risk itself. One way to reduce uncertainty is to improve the 
monitoring and quantification of bolides. There are extensive 
records of past bolides seen by U.S. government satellites, 
and these data have been used by Brown et al. (2002, 2013) 
to estimate the flux of 1-m- to 10-m-diameter asteroids 
(permission has now been granted for the scientific com-
munity to access more recent data; see http://neo.jpl.nasa.
gov/fireball). Another approach would be to launch dedicated 
satellites with missions optimized to observe and quantify 
bolides. Such a system would also provide immediate notice 
and location of an airburst event, which would aid in com-
munication to the public as well as recovery of meteorites.
The best way to reduce the risk from Chelyabinsk-class 
asteroids would be to implement a short-warning survey, 
with groundbased telescopes optimized to search the entire 
night sky on a roughly daily basis, which would find even 
asteroids and meteoroids much smaller than Chelyabinsk 
as they brighten during the last days or weeks of their final 
encounters with Earth (see section 5). An alternative or 
complementary measure could be an infrared space telescope 
with a position and cadence optimized to find small objects 
within days or weeks of impacts. Such systems would also 
find smaller objects that are not a threat, but that would be 
a potential boon to science, and could even be commer-
cialized with costs recouped by the recovery of meteorites 
and high-end adventure tourism (Boslough, 2014). If such 
a system had existed in 2013, the storyline of Chelyabinsk 
might read differently:
On February 15, 2013, at the crack of dawn, a 
glowing object appeared as expected in the clear 
southeastern sky seen from the industrial Russian city 
of Chelyabinsk. As it streaked nearly sideways across 
the sky it was tracked with scientific instruments, includ-
ing telescopes, spectrometers, high-definition cameras, 
radar, and calibrated radiometers. Optical pyrometers 
determined the temperature of the fireball as it cooled 
and changed color. As the spark-like fragments contin-
ued to fade out and fall in dark flight, they were still 
glowing in the thermal infrared and were tracked all 
the way to the ground, where they were immediately 
recovered and taken to meteorite laboratories that had 
been prepared for them.
Residents who had been warned to stay away from 
windows and to watch from a safe distance looked on 
in wonder. Hotels in outlying areas were filled with 
adventure tourists who had come from all over the 
world to see this once-in-a-lifetime spectacle. Some 
had volunteered to join scientific expeditions to scour 
the fall area for meteorites.
Researchers were able to use the wealth of high-
quality, calibrated data to improve models of ablation, 
fragmentation, breakup, and explosion, improving their 
understanding of the high deformation-rate processes 
that will ultimately improve risk assessment, as well 
as facilitate the design of more effective impulsive 
deflection methods if a larger hazardous asteroid is 
discovered with sufficient advance warning.
3.  CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
IMPACT HAZARD
Although the impact frequencies for NEAs with diameters, 
D, larger than 100 m are known quite well, and about 90% of 
NEAs with D > 1 km have been discovered, smaller NEAs 
are less well characterized. Relative to astronomical surveys 
of NEAs, actual impact events like Chelyabinsk (although 
small in number), and recalibration of infrasonic airwave data 
(Silber et al., 2009), suggest that the frequencies of impacts 
by bodies tens of meters in diameter may be several times 
higher than those estimated earlier from optical survey data.
Our present understanding of the numbers of NEAs and 
impact probabilities is summarized in Fig. 2, in which the 
curve traced by the circles represents current best estimates 
of the cumulative number of NEAs larger than a given diam-
eter. For a given H-value interval, optical survey population 
estimates are derived by counting the number of redetec-
tions of previously discovered objects compared to the total 
number of detections (new discoveries plus redetections) 
in the most recent survey period of two years. As the ratio 
of redetections to all detections approaches 100%, so does 
the survey completion. However, since some asteroids are 
easier to find than others, and the easy ones are discovered 
first, the estimated completion is actually always less than 
the redetection ratio. A correction to the completion estimate 
is derived using a realistic model of the NEA population and 
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a computer simulation of a hypothetical optical telescope 
survey over the same time period, in this case 20 years.
The latest update of the NEA population, presented in 
Fig. 2, appears to largely resolve the above-mentioned 
discrepancy in population estimates between astronomical 
surveys and bolide frequencies (Brown et al., 2013; Silber 
et al., 2009). Earlier population estimates from astronomi-
cal surveys obtained a population in the tens of meters size 
range about a factor of 3–4 lower than estimated from bolide 
and infrasound data (see, e.g., Harris, 2014). However, the 
most recent population estimate falls within the scatter over 
the size range of the bolide estimates.
To the best of our knowledge there is no current threat 
from any NEA larger than about 4 km in diameter, since they 
have probably all been found and none are on a threatening 
trajectory during the next century. There remains a very small 
but uncertain threat from large comets. Objects originating in 
the Oort cloud are discovered typically only about two years 
prior to perihelion, precluding any effective spaceborne de-
flection action in these cases. For example, Comet C/2013 A1 
(Siding Spring) was discovered in January 2013 on its way 
into the inner solar system from the Oort cloud. Early orbit 
calculations revealed a small probability that the comet would 
impact Mars on October 19, 2014, with a velocity of some 
56 km s–1. Even with a diameter of around 500 m, at the 
lower end of initial size estimates, an impact of the comet on 
Mars would have had dramatic, possibly global, effects, not 
to mention the potentially disastrous consequences for the 
valuable scientific assets on its surface and in orbit around 
it. Later refinements of the orbit of C/2013 A1 ruled out an 
impact but showed it would pass within around 20 martian 
diameters of the planet (Farnocchia et al., 2014).
Apart from the frequency of impacts by cosmic bodies 
of various sizes, a major question concerns the scale of 
damage such an impact might cause. The Chicxulub (K-Pg 
boundary) impact at 66 Ma presents a qualitative example 
of how very infrequent impacts by large NEOs can greatly 
change the global ecosphere and biosphere of Earth. Near-
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Fig. 2.  Estimated number of NEAs larger than a given diameter/brighter than a given 
absolute magnitude. The continuous curve represents discoveries as of August 2014; 
the curve traced by the circles represents the estimated total number of objects in the 
NEA population, derived from computer modeling of discovery and redetection rates 
by optical telescope surveys over the two-year period to August 2014. The population 
estimated in this way appears to be in excellent agreement with population estimates 
from bolide and infrasound data. The estimated mean interval between impacts of 
objects larger than a given diameter can be read off on the righthand scale using the 
curve traced by the circles. The conversion from H to diameter assumes an albedo of 
pV = 0.14. The uncertainty in the estimated population curve in the range D = ~10 to 
~100 m from all errors, observational, model, and the albedo assumption is probably 
less than a factor of 3. At larger sizes, the uncertainty is even less, diminishing to only 
a few percent for D ~ 1 km and larger.
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Earth objects with D = 2–3 km, and possibly as small as 
1 km, could destroy civilization as we know it, although the 
degree to which that civilization is robust or vulnerable to 
the multiple environmental effects of such impacts remains 
speculative. Impacts of bodies only 500 m in diameter 
could, for example, severely damage or destroy the ozone 
layer (Birks et al., 2007). Near-Earth objects of such sizes 
impacting in the ocean could also produce very destructive 
tsunami, although a number of studies (e.g., Gisler et al., 
2011; Wünnemann et al., 2007; Korycansky and Lynett, 
2005; and references therein) suggest that such waves would 
largely disperse before reaching coastlines, unless the impact 
were rather close to the coastline. The environmental conse-
quences of damage from a ground explosion are simulated 
in the online program Impact Earth [(http://www.purdue.edu/
impactearth/ — for details, including assumptions and uncer-
tainties, see Collins et al. (2005)]; how much infrastructure 
would be destroyed or how many lives would be lost would 
depend on proximity to the impact (see, e.g., Garbolino and 
Michel, 2011) and how much advance warning there was to 
strengthen infrastructure or evacuate the region.
Recently there has been emphasis on the effects of the 
smaller but much more frequent impacts of NEOs several 
tens of meters in diameter and smaller. A big issue has been, 
what is the smallest NEO that would be damaging? The 
NASA NEO Science Definition Team study (NASA SDT) 
(Stokes et al., 2003) concluded that NEOs with D < 40 m 
would explode rather harmlessly in the upper atmosphere, 
but that conclusion has been undercut for several reasons. 
First, Boslough and Crawford (2008) realized that downward 
momentum of a NEO through the atmosphere would be more 
damaging than a stationary explosion, and concluded that the 
great damage at Tunguska could have been produced by a 
body only ~40 m in diameter (a few megatons of equivalent 
energy). Second, we have learned that some types of smaller 
projectiles can be more damaging than the average, such as 
nickel-iron objects, which are relatively dense, and objects 
that can reach the ground by virtue of unusual aerodynamic 
shapes. Low cosmic velocities (12–14 km s–1) and shallow 
entry angles also contribute to reducing aerodynamic stress 
and may allow meter-sized stony meteoroids to reach the 
ground, such as the object that caused the 13-m-diameter 
impact crater near the Peruvian village of Carancas in 
2007 (Kenkmann, et al., 2009; Tancredi et al., 2009). The 
Chelyabinsk event (section 2) could have been even more 
destructive at ground zero if it had entered the atmosphere 
at a less shallow angle. On the other hand, the impact was 
unfortunately close to a major city, which would not usually 
be the case. One factor that needs to be recognized is that 
any nominal estimate of size (and associated damage po-
tential) has uncertainties that could be very great for a body 
discovered only shortly before impact. Asteroids have diverse 
compositions and shapes, wide ranges of albedo and bulk 
density, and other uncertain attributes, which could be dif-
ficult or impossible to assess before impact but conceivably 
could result in the nominal estimate of destructive energy 
being in error by an order of magnitude in either direction. 
Thus, even if a body just 10 m in diameter or smaller were 
predicted to strike a locality, a prudent civil defense official 
might well warn people to evacuate, or at least stay indoors 
in structurally sound buildings well clear of windows (to 
avoid flying glass), to cover their ears (to avoid eardrum 
rupture), and, where possible, to open all windows and doors 
(to minimize damage by the overpressure of the blast waves).
The general approach to dealing with the NEO hazard 
is to (1) search the skies for NEOs that may strike Earth; 
(2) plan and carry out a deflection spacecraft mission if 
there is sufficient time and the threat is sufficiently great 
(high probability of damaging impact); and/or (3) evacuate 
or otherwise prepare to mitigate the effects of an impact.
Telescopic searches for NEOs are of several kinds (see 
the chapter by Jedicke et al. in this volume). The Spaceguard 
Survey was designed to find >90% of NEOs >1 km in size, 
and it has accomplished that task, although taking some 
years longer than the mandated decade. As a byproduct, the 
Survey has found many NEOs down to hundreds of meters 
in diameter, and a statistical sample of those down to ~10 m 
in diameter. The Survey continues, although with modifica-
tions. The NASA NEO Science Definition Team report and 
the subsequently passed law by the U.S. Congress (George E. 
Brown, Jr. NEO Survey) recommend finding 90% of NEOs 
with diameters larger than 140 m within the near term. Vari-
ous groundbased, e.g., the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope 
(LSST), and spacebased, e.g., the NEOCam and Sentinel, 
projects are designed to meet this goal, although the timeframe 
for the surveys keeps slipping into the future. Yet another 
approach is to use dispersed small telescopes to cover the 
sky on a nightly basis and find NEOs as they approach Earth 
for the last time before striking. The Catalina Sky Survey, 
for example, found the tiny asteroid/meteoroid 2008 TC3 
just over 20 hours before it struck in the Sudanese desert. 
Several systems are under development [e.g., the University 
of Hawaii’s Asteroid Terrestrial-impact Last Alert System 
(ATLAS) or ESA’s Fly-Eye concepts — see section 5] that 
could find up to half of potential impactors during the days 
to months before impact — those coming from the night sky 
rather than from the daylit sky — providing adequate time 
for evacuation warnings.
If a sizeable NEA is discovered to be on a possible impact 
trajectory years or a decade or two before impact, then a space- 
craft mission designed to deflect the asteroid is technically 
feasible. Direct deflection of a hazardous NEA so that it 
passes several Earth radii away from Earth instead of strik-
ing Earth may be necessary in the worst case. However, an 
asteroid may closely approach Earth on a previous appari-
tion so that the perturbation by Earth’s gravitational field is 
just the right amount to cause its orbit to enter a resonance 
condition with Earth’s orbit and impact Earth on a later ap-
proach. The small region of space through which the NEA 
has to pass to enter a resonance is called a gravitational (or 
resonance) “keyhole” (see the chapter by Farnocchia et al. 
in this volume). A recent prominent example was the predic-
tion of a keyhole only about 600 m wide in the case of the 
2029 approach to within 35,000 km of Earth’s surface of 
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(99942) Apophis, a NEA with a diameter of some 325 m. If 
Apophis were to pass through the keyhole an impact with 
Earth would follow in the year 2036 (see, e.g., Yeomans et 
al., 2009). Fortunately, recent observations have ruled out a 
possible passage of Apophis through the keyhole. Accurate 
knowledge of an asteroid’s orbit allows the existence of 
keyholes for the object to be predicted well in advance. It is 
much easier to deflect the asteroid from passing through a 
small keyhole than having to deflect it by several Earth radii.
Studies of deflection missions are in their infancy (see 
section 4) but there appear to be no fundamental issues 
preventing existing technology from being put together 
rapidly to build a deflection mission, should the need arise. 
Similarly, the disaster response community has little fa-
miliarity with asteroid impact as a natural disaster, but the 
kinds of environmental effects arising from the atmospheric 
explosion or ground impact of a NEO are similar to those of 
more common natural disasters (Garshnek et al., 2000) so 
that, provided a predicted impact is properly communicated 
to relevant officials in the relevant nations or localities, it 
seems likely that appropriate responses to a predicted impact 
would result in most cases. There will always be, though 
diminishing with time as surveys advance, the chance that an 
unpredicted impact will occur, as in the case of Chelyabinsk.
4.  NEAR-EARTH ASTEROID  
DEFLECTION TECHNIQUES
Many ideas have been proposed to deflect an asteroid from 
an Earth-bound trajectory or to disrupt it. However, to date 
none has been tested in space and the feasibility of proposed 
techniques given present technology differs greatly.
Three apparently realistic methods have emerged from the 
numerous studies devoted to this topic, namely the kinetic 
impactor, the gravity tractor, and blast deflection, which are 
described below. Other suggested techniques include direct-
ing a laser beam at the asteroid’s surface to expel (ablate) 
material from it, thereby creating a force that moves the 
object so as to conserve linear momentum (Gibbings et al., 
2013). Similarly, the use of large mirrors or lenses to con-
centrate the Sun’s energy onto an asteroid using single or 
multiple spacecraft has been advocated. Another idea would 
be to exploit the momentum transmitted by a collimated beam 
of ions impacting the asteroid surface (Bombardelli et al., 
2013). Ion thrusters attached to a hovering spacecraft could 
be used for this purpose. The spacecraft, placed at a distance 
of a few asteroid diameters, would also need an ion thruster 
pointed in the opposite direction of the asteroid to balance 
the spacecraft’s reaction to the deflecting thrust and keep 
a constant distance between the asteroid and the shepherd 
spacecraft. A more speculative idea is to paint the surface of 
an asteroid to increase its albedo, thereby enhancing the solar 
radiation pressure acting upon it (Paek, 2012). These methods 
require much a priori knowledge of the asteroid and/or they 
involve technologies that require significant further develop-
ment. In particular, providing adequate power for deploying 
beams of light or ions to deflect a threatening NEA to a safe 
trajectory, developing systems that can operate continuously 
and reliably over periods of years, and the requirement for 
autonomous guidance and control of the deflecting spacecraft 
are all major technical challenges.
Most recent studies (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2010) find that 
the most reasonable approach in the vast majority of cases, 
especially for NEAs with diameters above about 100 m (see 
section 6), is deflection by hypervelocity kinetic impact by a 
massive spacecraft, while an observer spacecraft (preferably 
with a slow push or pull capability, such as a gravity tractor, 
as discussed below) looks on to assess the success and mag-
nitude of the deflection. The impact of the artificial projectile 
(spacecraft) transfers momentum to the NEA, causing a small 
change in velocity. If a large amount of ejecta is produced 
by the impact event then the momentum transferred can be 
greatly enhanced, as dictated by the law of conservation of 
momentum, resulting in a larger deflection of the object’s 
course. The production of ejecta increases the effectiveness 
of impulsive deflection techniques but the amount of ejecta 
produced depends strongly on the subsurface properties of 
the asteroid. A series of kinetic impactors should suffice for 
threatening NEAs possibly up to 1 km in size.
The NASA Deep Impact mission (A’Hearn et al., 2005) 
successfully caused an impactor to collide with the nucleus 
of Comet 9P/Tempel 1 on July 4, 2005. Due to the large 
mass of the 6-km-diameter nucleus, and nongravitational 
forces acting on it, it was not possible to measure a change 
in the comet’s trajectory resulting from the impact, so the 
experiment did not provide a measurement of momentum 
transfer to the comet. Nevertheless, the mission successfully 
impacted its target and highlighted the complex autonomous 
guidance necessary to do so.
The kinetic impactor technique has been the subject of a 
number of studies carried out by major space agencies. In 
2006 the European Space Agency funded and coordinated 
detailed studies of a kinetic impactor concept called Don 
Quijote, which consisted of an orbiter and a small impactor 
spacecraft arriving several months later than the orbiter (e.g., 
see Wolters et al., 2011, and references therein). The orbiter 
would first characterize the target and measure the deflec-
tion due to the impact of the second spacecraft. While the 
Don Quijote concept as such has not been funded to date, it 
has served as the inspiration for aspects of the NEOShield 
program and European participation in the AIDA concept. In 
early 2010, ESA, Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Phys-
ics Laboratory, NASA, the Côte d’Azur Observatory, and the 
German Aerospace Center initiated a study of AIDA, the aim 
of which is to deflect the small secondary of a binary asteroid, 
chosen so that the perturbation to the orbit of the secondary 
can be observed from groundbased facilities in 2022. The 
target is the binary asteroid (65803) Didymos. The mission 
(Cheng et al., 2015; Michel et al., 2015) has two independent 
components:  the projectile spacecraft, “Double Asteroid 
Redirection Test” (DART), which would be developed in 
the U.S., and the European rendezvous spacecraft Asteroid 
Impact Mission (AIM). DART would serve as a test of our 
ability to impact a small (150-m-diameter) object, while 
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AIM would allow it to be characterized in detail by observ-
ing the target before, during, and after the impact event. The 
advantage of the AIDA concept, compared to a mission to 
deflect a normal NEA, lies in the relative ease with which 
the orbit of a small binary moon around the primary can be 
changed to a measurable extent, and the fact that in the case 
of Didymos, due to the favorable observation geometry, the 
change can be measured by groundbased telescopes moni-
toring the variability of reflected sunlight caused by eclipses 
and occultations in the binary system. While groundbased 
observations would complement the observations made by 
AIM and provide a vital backup, AIM would measure the 
resulting change in orbit of the moon with greater accuracy, 
and would provide detailed in situ reconnaissance of the 
system’s physical characteristics. The results of the AIDA 
mission would allow the detailed verification of impact 
models on a realistic size scale. At the time of this writing 
AIDA is the only deflection mission concept that is actively 
under study by major space agencies. If funded for launch, 
the impact would occur in October 2022.
An alternative, relatively inexpensive, test of the kinetic 
impactor concept, under consideration in ongoing NEOShield 
work, would be to impact a NEA far from its rotation axis, 
thus causing a change in its rotation rate, which, depending 
on the choice of the target, could be measurable with ground-
based telescopes (NEOTωIST, Drube et al., in preparation). 
The change in rotation rate would provide insight into the 
same near-surface structural characteristics on which the ef-
ficiency of the kinetic impactor deflection concept depends. A 
possible target for such a test would be the NEA (25143) Ito-
kawa, which has been well studied by the Japanese Haya-
busa mission. The payload of the impactor spacecraft could 
include an ejectable science package to allow the impact to 
be observed and provide information on the crater forma-
tion, and ejecta mass and velocity distributions. While any 
type of deflection test would be very instructive, given the 
diverse properties of NEAs we should bear in mind that the 
responses to impacts could be very different for other NEAs.
In the case of the gravity tractor (Lu and Love, 2005), a 
spacecraft under power hovers near an asteroid and uses the 
gravitational attraction between it and the asteroid to tow the 
asteroid off course. Multiple spacecraft flying in formation 
could be deployed to expedite the gravity tractor maneuver 
and/or provide redundancy (Foster et al., 2013). Given the 
very small tractor/asteroid mass ratio, this technique is only 
useful for small objects, but since small NEAs are more 
numerous than larger ones, a gravity tractor might suffice 
for the most likely scenarios in which deflection seems to 
be warranted, depending on the available time before the 
predicted impact. How small is still a matter of debate, 
but the current practical upper diameter limit suggested by 
recent (as yet unpublished) NEOShield results is around 
50 m for a direct impact trajectory [Shapiro et al. (2010) 
give roughly 100 m for the same limit]. The main difficulty 
is developing reliable autonomous control systems able to 
keep the tractor at a fixed distance from a small, rotating, 
irregularly shaped asteroid, possibly for a period of many 
years. If time is insufficient for the use of a gravity tractor 
as sole deflector, a currently realistic scenario is deployment 
of the gravity tractor as a secondary deflection technique to 
an impulsive primary strike. For example, an appropriately 
designed and instrumented spacecraft could first act in a 
reconnaissance capacity and study the NEA in advance of 
the impact, subsequently remain in place to monitor the 
deflection, and have the capability to finally act as a gravity 
tractor to adjust the post-impact trajectory of the NEA, if 
necessary. Alternatively, if the threatening object were due 
to pass through a keyhole, then a relatively small deflection, 
which could be performed by a gravity tractor alone, would 
suffice to cause the object to miss the keyhole. In fact, in 
the case of keyhole avoidance, the gravity tractor alone may 
suffice to deflect much larger asteroids.
While the gravity tractor appears to be feasible with 
current technology, the slow-push alternatives, such as the 
ion-beam shepherd and laser ablation mentioned above, 
may in time prove to be more practical and effective per 
kilogram of launch mass in many cases, depending on 
future developments of the relevant technologies and the 
details of the hazard scenario. An important advantage of the 
gravity tractor is that few characteristics of the NEA need 
to be known in advance. However, gravity tractors and the 
alternative slow-push techniques are weak, so depending on 
the time available and the circumstances of the NEA’s orbit 
(presence of keyholes), the much more powerful capability 
of a kinetic impactor may be desirable or necessary.
In the very unlikely case of a very large hazardous as-
teroid and/or inadequate time for the deployment of other 
deflection techniques, “blast deflection” with a nuclear 
device may offer the only technically feasible solution: 
This technique requires the use of an explosive close to, on 
the surface of, or buried beneath the surface of the NEA. 
Complete disruption of the threatening object would be an 
option if it were small enough so that the largest pieces of 
debris would not present a hazard on impact. Otherwise, the 
blast should be designed to deflect the asteroid, not break it 
up. The blast from a nuclear device would cause the outer 
layers of the NEA to evaporate and be expelled from the 
surface. The effect would be similar to rocket propulsion, 
thus altering the asteroid’s trajectory. Burying an explosive 
on the asteroid before setting it off, or delivering the device 
by means of a surface penetrator, would probably be most 
effective at ejecting surface material, but this method would 
require prior knowledge of the material properties and sub-
surface structure of the object. A deflection mission concept 
study supported by NASA’s Innovative Advanced Concepts 
Program combines a kinetic impactor mission with a nuclear 
device for deflection of large asteroids, or for cases in which 
there is very little warning time. In the very unlikely case 
of a large comet, deflection would be very challenging at 
best due to the likely short lead time and nongravitational 
forces affecting the comet’s trajectory. In any case, political 
and legal objections, not to mention technical issues, would 
have to be overcome before nuclear explosive devices could 
be used for NEA deflection.
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5.  CURRENT PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES
At the time of this writing there are a number of ground- 
based telescopes under development with the goal of dis-
covering very small NEOs to provide advance warning of 
about one week for objects with diameters in the range 
30–50 m, and longer times for larger objects. Examples of 
such wide-field, rapid-scan search programs currently under 
development are ESA’s Fly-Eye (Farnocchia et al., 2012) 
and NASA’s ATLAS (Tonry, 2011). Plans for ATLAS include 
up to eight small telescopes, each fitted with cameras of 
up to 100 megapixels. According to the ATLAS team, the 
system should offer a warning of about 1 week in the case 
of a 50-m-diameter asteroid or “city killer,” and 3 weeks 
for a 150-m “small country killer.” Such wide-field survey 
systems will complement the established surveys, such as 
the Catalina Sky Survey and Pan-STARRS, in being able to 
provide warning of small objects in the final phase of their 
plunge to Earth, thereby enabling measures on the ground, 
such as evacuation, to be carried out.
Apart from the work to discover and track NEOs, there 
is much ongoing groundbased effort to investigate their 
physical properties. Observations in the visible and infrared 
spectral regions of light reflected from asteroid surfaces 
are a powerful means of studying their compositions and 
assigning them to taxonomic classes. For reviews of earlier 
work the reader is referred to Binzel et al. (2002), and for 
more recent developments, to the chapters in this volume, 
such as those by Binzel et al. and DeMeo et al. Efforts to 
derive information on the physical properties of asteroids 
by observing absorption features in reflected sunlight are 
complemented by observations of thermally emitted infrared 
radiation and radar investigations. The latter two approaches, 
briefly discussed here, have brought major advances relevant 
to the impact hazard since the publication of Asteroids III.
A survey of the sizes and albedos of more than 100,000 
asteroids has been carried out by the NASA WISE space 
telescope (Wright et al., 2010). WISE was launched to 
Earth orbit in December 2009 carrying a 40-cm-diameter 
telescope and infrared detectors. WISE surveyed the sky for 
12 months and the objects observed included a total of at 
least 584 NEOs, of which more than 130 were new discover-
ies (Mainzer et al., 2011). The specially funded Near-Earth 
Object Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (NEOWISE) 
program analyzed images collected by the WISE spacecraft 
to derive information on the NEOs detected. The fact that 
the cryogenic phase of the WISE mission measured asteroid 
thermal emission in up to four infrared bands, centered on 
3.4, 4.6, 12, and 22 µm, allowed reliable values of diameter, 
albedo, and other parameters to be derived for many of the 
asteroids observed. Mainzer et al. (2011) report that after 
debiasing with a synthetic NEO population, the NEOWISE 
results imply a total of some 980 for the number of NEOs 
larger than 1 km. These results mean that the Spaceguard 
goal of detecting 90% of all NEOs with diameters larger than 
1 km has now been met (see the chapter by Mainzer et al. 
in this volume). A complementary program to NEOWISE, 
“ExploreNEOs” (Trilling et al., 2010; see also the chapter 
by Mainzer et al. in this volume), has used the Spitzer Space 
Telescope to observe some 600 previously detected NEOs to 
study the size and albedo distributions of the NEO popula-
tion, and identify NEOs that may have a cometary origin or 
that could serve as accessible and scientifically interesting 
targets for future robotic or manned space missions.
Following in the footsteps of the successful Infrared As-
tronomical Satellite (IRAS) mission in 1983, the WISE and 
Spitzer missions have highlighted the value of spacebased 
infrared telescopes for basic physical characterization of the 
asteroid population. In addition to size and albedo informa-
tion, application of thermal models to thermal-infrared ob-
servations has revealed their potential to provide information 
on thermal inertia and mineralogy, including the presence of 
metal on the surfaces of asteroids (Harris and Drube, 2014). 
A threatening NEA containing a large amount of metal would 
presumably be relatively robust and massive, depending 
on its internal structure, factors that would require careful 
consideration by deflection-mission planners and/or those 
mandated to manage mitigation, e.g., evacuation and other 
activities on the ground in advance of a possible impact. 
Moreover, the identification of NEAs with high metal content 
is an important task for endeavors in the field of planetary 
resources. Metal-rich asteroids could provide a vast reservoir 
of vital materials for future interplanetary space activities and 
perhaps eventually for use on Earth.
The success of NEOWISE suggests that future missions 
with more sensitive spacebased infrared telescopes, designed 
specifically for NEO detection, would bring major advances 
in our knowledge of the mitigation-relevant small end of the 
NEO size distribution, and may even provide a useful guide 
for interplanetary prospectors. Examples of such spacebased 
infrared telescopes currently under study are the Near-Earth 
Object Camera (NEOCam) and Sentinel (see the chapter by 
Jedicke et al. in this volume). In particular, a spacebased 
infrared telescope on a heliocentric orbit inside that of Earth, 
such as the Sentinel spacecraft, would have an advantage 
over Earth-based telescopes in detecting Aten asteroids and 
inner-Earth objects (Atiras), which spend much of their time 
in the daylit sky as seen from Earth.
Radar is a crucial means of obtaining very accurate 
astrometric data for NEOs. Radar observations can provide 
enormous improvements in the precision of a NEO’s orbit 
and allow the position of the object to be projected much 
further into the future than allowed by optical monitoring 
alone. The uncertainty in the prediction of a future impact 
can be dramatically reduced with the help of radar data or, 
much more likely, a possible impact can be ruled out (Ostro 
and Giorgini, 2004). Radar is also a powerful method for 
the characterization of NEOs, especially their sizes, shapes, 
and surface structure. A radar echo contains information not 
only on the position and velocity of a NEO, but also on a 
number of mitigation-relevant physical parameters. Radiation 
transmitted at a single frequency is returned from a rotating 
asteroid with a spread of (Doppler-shifted) frequencies, each 
component frequency being associated with a particular time 
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delay depending on the distance to the reflecting surface 
element. The “delay-Doppler” distribution of echo power is 
determined by the size, spin rate, orientation, and shape of 
the target asteroid, and radar reflectivity of the surface mate-
rial. Given a suitable transmission coding, the information 
in a radar echo can be processed to provide resolved radar 
“images” of asteroids. The strength of the echo, normalized 
to the size and distance of the target (“radar albedo”), can 
provide information on the mineralogy of the asteroid surface, 
in particular its metal content. A circularly polarized transmis-
sion will give rise to a mix of “opposite sense” (OC) and 
“same sense” (SC) polarized radiation in the echo, depending 
on the number of reflections taking place at the surface. The 
ratio of SC/OC polarization in the echo is an indicator of the 
roughness of the surface at the scale of the radar wavelength 
(typically 3–13 cm). In particular, radar observations have 
observed a large number of binary NEAs, and have taught 
us that small asteroids can have very irregular shapes but 
also that some NEAs are surprisingly round, with equatorial 
bulges, suggestive of loose agglomerates of boulders and 
gravel that change shape as the spin rate exceeds a critical 
value, presumably preceding the spinning off of material 
that may then accumulate to form a moon (see the chapter 
by Walsh and Jacobson in this volume). For an overview of 
radar observations of asteroids, see the chapter by Benner 
et al. in this volume.
Rendezvous missions are a valuable source of mitigation-
relevant physical information on particular NEAs. A concept 
under study by NASA at the time of writing is the Asteroid 
Redirect Mission (ARM), in which either an asteroid with 
a diameter of less than 10 m is captured whole, or a 2–3-m 
boulder from a larger NEA is collected, and brought into 
lunar orbit (see the chapter by Abell et al. in this volume). 
For the second option, NASA is considering a test of the 
gravity-tractor concept by using the combined mass of the 
spacecraft and the boulder to slightly change the orbit of 
the mother NEA. In general, regardless of which option is 
chosen, experience gained with ARM in the rendezvous and 
approach phases, and in capturing and maneuvering large 
masses with a solar-electric powered spacecraft, will be of 
direct benefit to mission planning for planetary defense.
While their primary aim is to contribute to our understand-
ing of solar system history, sample-return missions to asteroids 
also provide valuable information for planetary defense. The 
Japanese Hayabusa mission was the first mission to return 
samples of an asteroid to Earth. The micrometer-sized grains 
returned by Hayabusa from the NEA (25143) Itokawa al-
lowed a direct link to be demonstrated between asteroids of 
S taxonomic type and the LL class of meteorites (Nakamura 
et al., 2011). JAXA launched the Hayabusa-2 mission (see, 
e.g., Tsuda et al., 2013) on December 3, 2014, with the aim 
of returning a sample from the primitive (i.e., relatively un-
processed) C-class NEA (162173) Ryugu (1999 JU3), which 
has a diameter of about 750 m. The payload includes a 
small copper projectile designed to impact the surface of the 
NEA at about 2 km s–1, and a small camera to observe the 
event. Observations in real time of the production of a crater 
would provide data of direct relevance to deflection studies. 
In addition, a small European lander, the Mobile Asteroid 
Surface Scout (MASCOT), will perform in situ compositional 
measurements. NASA is also developing a sample-return 
mission called the Origins Spectral Interpretation Resource 
Identification and Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) 
(Lauretta et al., 2012). Launch is currently scheduled for Sep-
tember 2016. The sample mechanism is designed to collect 
between 60 g and a few kilograms, depending on the surface 
properties of the target, namely the primitive B-type NEA 
(101955) Bennu, which has a diameter of ~450 m.
It is important not only to improve our understanding of 
the mitigation-relevant physical properties of small NEAs, 
but also to develop technically and financially realistic test 
missions to enable deflection concepts to be tried out on real 
NEA targets, representative of the sort of objects that could 
threaten Earth in the not-too-distant future. Given the diverse 
observed shapes and mineralogies, and strong evidence for 
relatively low bulk densities, high porosities, and loose 
rubble-pile structures among NEAs, demonstrating that we 
can actually measurably change the orbit of a NEA is a vital 
step in building confidence that we can defend our civilization 
from a natural hazard that will otherwise cause serious loss 
of life and property in the future, if not threaten our long-
term survival on planet Earth. The NEOShield project has 
performed industrial studies of test missions for the kinetic 
impactor, gravity tractor, and blast deflection concepts, as 
well as studies of the future evolution of NEA orbits after 
deflection attempts. While an actual deflection demonstration 
mission was financially beyond the scope of the NEOShield 
project, the aim was to provide the first designs of appropriate 
demonstration missions, sufficiently detailed to facilitate the 
rapid development of such a mission in subsequent rounds of 
project funding in a European/international frame.
Results from the type of studies carried out by NEOShield 
and similar programs obviously also serve to reduce the sci-
entific and technical preparatory work required to bring an 
appropriate and viable deflection mission to the launch pad 
in an emergency situation.
6.  WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW:   
PRESSING AREAS OF CONCERN
Although it will happen one day, the likelihood of any 
generation being confronted with a threatening object with a 
diameter, D, of around 300 m or larger is extremely small. In 
any case, NEO survey programs may provide several decades 
of warning time in which to prepare a response, although 
at present an estimated 40% of such objects remain to be 
discovered. Therefore, in the case of large objects, we should 
normally have sufficient time between hazard identification 
and the predicted time of impact to physically character-
ize the NEO using Earth-based telescopes and rendezvous 
missions, and prepare and test an appropriate deflection 
mission. The lower size threshold below which we could 
safely ignore an approaching object is subject to debate 
(see below). Even a NEO with a diameter of just 20 m can 
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cause serious damage, impacting on average about once or 
twice per century. It would therefore seem prudent to take 
precautionary measures well in advance, and not wait until 
a threatening object is identified. Apart from civil defense 
planning in case a late detection precludes a deflection at-
tempt, appropriate measures include investigations of the 
mitigation-relevant physical properties of small NEOs, such 
as composition, density, porosity, internal structure, spin rate, 
and shape, and the development and testing of appropriate 
and reliable deflection techniques. Unfortunately, our current 
knowledge of the NEO population is very biased toward the 
large end of the size range, since large NEOs are brighter 
and more readily detected and observed. Relatively little is 
known about the small members of the population and much 
work remains to be done in exploring their deflection-relevant 
physical properties.
At present we have no clear idea of how the international 
community would respond to the announcement of a cred-
ible threat from a NEO identified as significantly hazardous. 
After discovery of the NEO in question and initial orbit 
refinement, the threat could be expressed only as a prob-
ability for those parts of Earth lying on the “risk corridor” 
(the track of possible impact points allowed by imperfect 
knowledge of the object’s trajectory; see Fig. 3). We would 
not know for sure whether the object would impact or not 
due to the observational uncertainties in the orbit and fac-
tors influencing its evolution, and we would only have a 
poor idea of what damage it would cause if it did. If, for 
example, the probability of impact somewhere on Earth in 
15 years’ time were to be estimated at 5%, politicians could 
argue that with a 95% probability of a miss there is hardly 
any justification for action to be taken (depending, perhaps, 
on whether their part of the world were in the risk corridor!). 
Indeed, one would normally expect the impact probability to 
suddenly drop, after initially rising, as further observations 
reduce the uncertainty region so that Earth is no longer 
within it (see, e.g., Chesley and Spahr, 2004). However, if 
Earth were to remain within the uncertainty region as more 
observational data are gathered, the probability might rise to 
levels at which an international consensus for action builds, 
regardless of other circumstances, and valuable time would 
have been lost for characterizing the object and preparing 
a spaceborne deflection mission. One of the most difficult 
challenges faced by astronomers and scientists involved in 
impact-hazard assessment is ensuring that politicians and 
decision makers are adequately informed of, and understand, 
the level of the risk at each stage and how it might develop 
with time, i.e., how to interpret evolving impact probabilities 
based on uncertain observational data and incomplete knowl-
edge of factors influencing a NEO’s orbit. Critical decisions 
Fig. 3.  Example of a hypothetical impact-risk corridor, traced by the black dots extending from the eastern Pacific Ocean, 
through the Philippines, Southeast Asia, India, to Turkey. In the event the fictional asteroid were to impact Earth, it would do 
so somewhere within the region traced by the dots. Credit:  P. Chodas, NASA/JPL [emergency response exercise conducted 
during the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) 2015 Planetary Defense Conference in Frascati, Italy, April 13–17, 2015].
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would have to be made as a threatening impact scenario 
evolves concerning what type(s) of mitigation or deflection 
measure(s) need to be implemented, depending on the size, 
hence potential destructive power, of the threatening NEO. 
The answers necessarily depend on some other aspects of 
the specific scenario, such as duration of advance warning, 
whether the predicted impact will be in or over an ocean or 
instead will involve a populated land region, or the avail-
ability of heavy-lift launch vehicles.
From a politician’s point of view the consequences 
of “getting it wrong” would be a prime consideration in 
the decision-making process. Spending the equivalent of 
hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars on a deflection 
campaign, only to learn at a later stage that new observa-
tional data imply that the hazardous object will in fact just 
miss Earth, or that its potential for damage had been grossly 
overestimated, could lead to serious loss of credibility in the 
eyes of the public, not only for the politicians involved but 
also for the scientific community. On the other hand, ignor-
ing a threat that turns out to have more serious consequences 
than nominally assumed from the available observational data 
and estimated probabilities would be a far worse outcome. In 
any case, civil defense planning should always be considered 
when a threatening object is identified, not only in the case 
of small objects, e.g., on the scale of Chelyabinsk, but also 
for larger objects as a back-up measure in case a deflection 
mission fails. At least in the next couple of decades, it is most 
likely that predicted impacts by small NEAs will involve 
days to weeks, or possibly months, of warning, because in 
general small NEAs would be detected during their final 
plunges to Earth (see section 5). Such warning times are 
typical of, or longer than, warning times for evacuation of 
cities or coastlines in the cases of other natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes/typhoons. But in most cases, such as 
those resembling, or smaller than, Chelyabinsk, sheltering in 
place and staying away from windows is preferable to evacu-
ation. As a precaution against unusual circumstances or early 
uncertainties about the mass of a recently discovered NEA, 
such warnings might even be given for predicted impacts by 
bodies estimated to be as small as a few meters in diameter.
Above what size of impactor would a deflection mission 
be called for? Since development and execution of such a 
mission takes years to perhaps a decade, the question of 
whether or not to seriously embark on such an endeavor 
will most likely arise well before the magnitude of the threat 
is well known. In particular, how large an impactor can be 
allowed to strike without a deflection? And does a spacefar-
ing nation start spending money on such a mission when the 
probability of striking Earth is just 1%, or must it be 50% or 
greater? If the probability of striking Earth were only a few 
percent, it seems unlikely that society would fund such an 
ambitious project. Perhaps 10% or 30% is a more appropri-
ate threshold for action, although it would certainly depend 
on the specifics of the threat, and it would be influenced by 
public attitudes and political and economic considerations. 
In almost all cases, the risk corridor will be known soon 
after discovery of the threat, even though the probability of 
actually impacting may be very low. Assuming, as is prob-
able, that the risk corridor does cross populated regions, it 
is unlikely (despite the Chelyabinsk example) that it will 
threaten a major population area or truly critical infrastruc-
ture, in which case allowing a Tunguska-sized object to 
enter the atmosphere, and employing civil defense measures 
only, should be a reasonable response (unless it is known in 
advance that the object has a metallic composition; see sec-
tion 5). It is more problematic to allow a 50–100-m-diameter 
NEA strike without a deflection attempt, but surely above 
100 m diameter a deflection would seem to be mandatory, 
if feasible.
In terms of the development of appropriate deflection 
techniques, we have only just started to consider realistic 
possibilities; indeed, the choice of deflection technique 
will depend on knowledge of the physical properties of the 
threatening object (see, e.g., Michel, 2013). There are many 
schools of thought on how asteroids could be deflected 
(section 4). The kinetic impactor appears to offer a realistic 
approach for objects in the size range 100–500 m. Sending 
a spacecraft to collide with an asteroid at high relative ve-
locity appears to be feasible, although this method and its 
associated technology remain to be verified in a test mission. 
Studies, such as those of the Don Quijote and AIDA concepts 
(see section 4), imply that the technique could provide an 
impulse of sufficient magnitude to deflect an object in the 
aforementioned size range (the secondary of a binary object 
in the case of AIDA), given some years of warning time, 
depending on the size and orbit of the asteroid. However, 
there are many outstanding questions associated with the 
kinetic impactor technique:  How much impactor kinetic en-
ergy may be wasted in compaction and restructuring, rather 
than excavating momentum-enhancing ejecta? How does the 
target NEA’s momentum change depend on parameters such 
as its bulk density, porosity, mineralogy, and subsurface/
internal structure, and the velocity vector of the impactor 
relative to the NEA (see the chapter by Jutzi et al. in this 
volume)? Can ejecta production be characterized in terms 
of mineralogy and taxonomic type? If so, such knowledge 
would greatly increase the value of groundbased observa-
tions for deflection mission planning. Preliminary work 
carried out within the European-funded NEOShield project 
suggests that the momentum transferred by an artificial 
projectile to a nonporous body is significantly greater (by 
up to 10× the momentum of the projectile) than to a porous 
body (Jutzi and Michel, 2014), a result that is consistent 
with laboratory impact experiments using scaling laws to 
extrapolate the results to asteroid scales (e.g., Holsapple and 
Housen, 2012). However, much work remains to be done 
to enable reliable predictions to be made as to how a NEA 
with a particular set of physical parameters would respond 
to an impacting spacecraft.
Furthermore, there are a number of important issues 
relating to the targeting accuracy achievable with current 
technology. The efficiency of momentum transfer from the 
impactor to the hazardous NEA depends crucially on the 
impact accuracy. While linear momentum is conserved, a 
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spacecraft impacting near the end of an elongated object 
would waste kinetic energy in changing the spin state of the 
object rather than producing momentum-enhancing ejecta. 
The most effective collision trajectory would be aimed at 
the center of mass of the asteroid. How would the necessary 
camera resolution and autonomous control-loop response 
time depend on the approach velocity, target size, thruster 
sizing, and required accuracy of the impact location? What 
is the trade-off between impactor approach trajectory, impact 
accuracy, and potentially unfavorable illumination conditions 
(e.g., approach from a high solar phase angle)? These are 
examples of questions that need to be addressed before we 
could be confident that a kinetic-impactor mission would 
have the desired effect. It is clear from the above discussion 
that not only does the kinetic impactor technique have an 
upper size limit on its applicability due to current limita-
tions on launch mass, but also a lower size limit given by 
the targeting accuracy achievable with current autonomous 
guidance, navigation, and control systems.
Other currently favored deflection techniques that may be 
more suited to smaller bodies, or cases in which only a small 
deflection is required (such as avoidance of a “keyhole” — 
see section 3), include the so-called slow-push (or -pull) 
techniques, such as those involving the use of lasers or ion 
beams and the gravity tractor (see section 4). Such techniques 
differ considerably in terms of their maturity. The gravity 
tractor concept has the advantage of relative simplicity and, 
given current technology (but as yet without the benefit of 
practical experience), is considered to be the most reliable 
option in the class of non-impulsive techniques.
If the discovery of a threatening NEA leads to the decision 
to develop a deflection mission, which kind of deflection 
technique would be most appropriate? Here we assume cur-
rently available launch vehicle capabilities, a few decades of 
warning, a NEA bulk density of 2 g cm–3, and that populated 
regions are near ground zero or near the risk corridor. We 
assume that the purpose of deflection is to miss Earth by a 
comfortable margin (2.5 R⊕ from Earth’s center), although 
there will be cases where the much easier task of deflec-
tion — to miss a small keyhole — is all that is required. 
These issues were evaluated by Shapiro et al. (2010). It is 
anticipated that one or a series of kinetic impactors could 
reasonably deflect an NEA of 500 m to ≤1 km in diameter. 
For most scenarios involving larger bodies, a nuclear device 
is the only sufficiently energetic approach for deflection. A 
gravity tractor acting for a decade could deflect a NEA of 
up to ~50 m in diameter. So the kinetic impactor approach 
to deflection would be appropriate for most of the truly 
dangerous scenarios for which deflection is mandatory in 
order to prevent a regional catastrophe (e.g., an impact that 
could lay waste to land areas the size of a country or a U.S. 
state). Such an approach, for NEAs mainly in the diameter 
range of 100 to 500 m, would necessarily require a high 
degree of reliability, which could be assured by appropriate 
physical characterization of the threatening body by precur-
sor investigation, supplemented by an observer spacecraft to 
witness the deflection operation and assess its success, and 
finally, if necessary, function as a gravity tractor. It would, 
of course, be desirable to have backup kinetic impactors and 
gravity tractors in case the first ones fail.
One can question whether a deflection technique with 
excessive capability might be used on a smaller NEA. For 
example, a nuclear device could surely deflect or even destroy 
a NEA much smaller than 0.5–1 km. We suggest that such 
possible use is not realistic because of the serious ancillary 
political issues involving development of such a capability, 
legal issues concerning practicing such a capability in outer 
space, and expected widespread public objection to using 
such a technique, except perhaps as a measure of last resort. 
On the other hand, there is the concern that procrastination in 
approving and implementing feasible nonnuclear deflection 
missions might leave nuclear as the only last-minute option, 
which would pose a serious geopolitical dilemma.
Should kinetic impactors be used even for NEAs smaller 
than 100 m, where a slow-push/pull method could be suf-
ficient? Here, the answer may be “yes.” Of course, the 
kinetic impactor approach is inherently less precise because 
it involves direct interaction with the possibly heterogeneous 
surface of the NEA for which the momentum enhancement 
factor may be very uncertain. However, a kinetic impactor 
can accomplish its task with an instantaneous strike rather 
than having to operate reliably for many years.
In Table 1 we give an overview of our current state of know- 
ledge (or perhaps ignorance!) of the impact hazard for dif-
ferent sizes of impactor and appropriate mitigation strategies 
given current technology. Some knowledge of the physical 
properties of a threatening NEA is necessary to ensure the 
successful outcome of a deflection attempt. The type of 
knowledge required depends on the deflection technique 
in question (see, e.g., Michel, 2013):  A gravity tractor has 
to operate for long periods of time in close vicinity to the 
NEA, but does not physically interact with the surface; in 
this case, therefore, accurate information on the mass, shape, 
and rotation vector of the object are required, which can be 
obtained by the spacecraft after it arrives at the object, but 
other physical properties are largely irrelevant. On the other 
hand, in the case of a kinetic impactor, knowledge of density, 
porosity, and internal structure would also be important for 
a predictable outcome. In the case of a deflection mission 
based on a laser, ion-beam, or explosive device, knowledge 
of the mineralogical composition of the surface material 
would also be relevant.
The NEOShield consortium, among others, has performed 
studies of observational data on NEAs (see, e.g., Harris and 
Drube, 2014) and laboratory experiments, including hyper-
velocity impacts on asteroid surface analog materials, and 
carried out related computer simulations (see, e.g., Jutzi and 
Michel, 2014). While our knowledge of NEA properties has 
grown significantly over the past decade, our knowledge of the 
deflection-relevant internal structures of NEAs is still seriously 
lacking. Available data on the distribution of lightcurve ampli-
tudes and spin rates (Fig. 4) suggest that many fast-spinning 
objects take on more symmetrical shapes, presumably due to 
restructuring caused by spin-induced movement and relocation 
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of material in a rubble-pile-like structure with little cohesion. 
The fact that binary objects cluster just below the spin barrier 
for gravity-dominated bodies with diameters larger than about 
300 m (spin period ~2 h) also suggests that many objects in 
this size category have insufficient cohesion or strength to 
withstand faster rotation (Figs. 4 and 5); on the other hand, 
many of the asteroids smaller than 300 m rotate much faster, 
implying they must have a cohesive structure, even if just a 
small amount of cohesion appears to be sufficient for them 
to survive (Holsapple, 2007). Sánchez and Scheeres (2014) 
hypothesize that van der Waals forces acting between small 
dust grains in a rubble pile can give rise to cohesion:  Boul-
ders and pebbles of diverse sizes could be held in place by a 
surrounding matrix of finer material. In this picture even very 
small objects with large lightcurve amplitudes (and therefore 
probably elongated shapes) could exist as rubble piles but spin 
more rapidly than the spin barrier for gravity-dominated ob-
jects. For example, work by Rozitis et al. (2014) implies that 
the fast-spinning kilometer-sized NEA (29075) 1950 DA is a 
rubble pile held together by weak cohesive forces comparable 
to, or less than, the forces between grains in lunar regolith. 
However, if the spin rate of a rubble pile is increased, as a re-
sult of the Yarkovsky-O’Keefe-Radzievskii-Paddack (YORP) 
effect or a close planetary encounter, then the object could 
disintegrate, giving rise to small monolithic bodies. While 
observational data and modeling results are consistent with 
rubble-pile structures being common among NEAs, the fact 
that numerous small objects spin at rates above the Sánchez 
and Scheeres (2014) disruption limit (Fig. 5) suggests the 
possible existence of monolithic asteroids at the small end 
of the size distribution.
In any case, the fact that small asteroids can have very high 
rotation rates (some measurements exceed 1 rev/min) is an 
important consideration for a deflection mission. In the case 
of a kinetic impactor, fast rotation, combined with imperfect 
knowledge of the target’s shape, and rapid approach from a 
TABLE 1.  Estimated near-Earth asteroid numbers, impact intervals, impact consequences, and mitigation possibilities.
NEA 
Diameter, 
D (m)
Estimated Total 
Number* with 
Diameter ≥D in the 
NEA Population
Indicative Impact 
Interval (yr)* for 
NEAs with 
Diameter ≥D
Possible Consequences of Impact 
Near Populated Region†
Appropriate Mitigation/Deflection 
Strategy Assuming Current 
Technology
10 100 million 5 Meteorite falls; crater unlikely Civil defense only
30 3 million 150 Chelyabinsk/Tunguska-type 
airburst; crater, depending on 
composition; some injuries and 
deaths
Civil defense only
50 500,000 1000 Violent Tunguska-type airburst; 
crater, depending on composition; 
potentially many injuries and 
deaths
Slow push/pull (e.g., gravity 
tractor) or kinetic impactor, if 
feasible, civil defense only if not
100 50,000 10,000 Crater 1–2 km in diameter; local 
destruction; tsunami risk from near-
shore impacts; many deaths likely
Civil defense; slow push/pull or 
kinetic impactor — slow push/
pull combination
300 7000 70,000 Crater several kilometers in 
diameter; regional/national 
destruction; tsunami risk; 
potentially millions of deaths
Kinetic impactor — slow push/
pull combination if feasible, 
explosive impulse if not, plus 
civil defense if practical
500 3500 140,000 Crater some 10 km in diameter; 
international catastrophe; tsunami 
risk; potentially millions of deaths
Kinetic impactor — slow push/
pull combination if feasible; 
several kinetic impactors may be 
necessary. Explosive impulse if 
no alternative
1000 1000 500,000 Global effects; partial disruption of 
civilization
Series of kinetic impactors or 
large explosive impulse
10,000 3‡ 100 million End of present civilization Series of large explosive 
impulses; deflection may not be 
feasible with current technology
* Estimated from current detections (see Fig. 2).
†  The effects listed are rough estimates based on incomplete knowledge of NEA physical characteristics and impact processes in the atmosphere and 
on the ground. The actual outcome of an impact could differ considerably, depending on parameters such as composition and density of the impac-
tor, impact velocity, impact angle, and the nature of the surface impacted.
‡ The remaining risk is dominated by long-period comets; deflection would not be possible with any foreseeable technology (see section 3).
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high solar phase angle could significantly increase the risk 
of a navigation error and failure to impact at the required 
position. In the case of a gravity tractor, maneuvering and 
station keeping close to the surface of an irregularly shaped 
asteroid with an irregular gravity field become more difficult 
at high rotation rates. Since fast-rotating NEAs appear to be 
common, and deflecting a fast-rotating target is likely to be 
technically challenging, a deflection demonstration mission 
targeting a representative relatively fast rotator would provide 
a revealing test of current NEA deflection capabilities.
Studies of NEA physical properties, including laboratory 
work, numerical modeling, and computer simulations, are 
essential aspects of a program to develop deflection technol-
ogy, but they are not sufficient to enable robust predictions 
to be made of the outcome of a deflection attempt. We may 
one day be faced with having to decide on a risky deflection 
mission without having time to acquire adequate information 
on the physical properties of the threatening object. We would 
obviously obtain the best knowledge of the body possible 
using available astronomical facilities, but that might still 
result in uncertainties of a factor of a few in the body’s mass 
and ignorance of other relevant characteristics. A “bang and 
hope” mission with an uncertain outcome would be our only 
option, although we could improve our chances by preparing 
back-up missions and taking civil defense action. In any case, 
to minimize the uncertainties in the outcome of a deflection 
mission, it would seem prudent to test our concepts and as-
sumptions in experimental missions to deflect suitable repre-
sentative NEA targets before we are forced to apply deflection 
technology in a hurry in a real impact-prevention scenario.
7.  INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION EFFORTS 
AND THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
Protecting Earth from NEO impacts is a global problem 
and, as such, any deflection strategy should involve at least 
the most scientifically and technologically capable nations. 
However, all nations, especially those with large geographical 
areas or regions of high population density, should be encour-
aged to take part in discussions and decision-making concern-
ing mitigation planning in general. Impact-hazard-related 
activities at the UN were prompted by the recommendations 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration 
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) held in 
Vienna in July 1999. Following the UNISPACE III recom-
mendations the Action Team on Near-Earth Objects (AT-14) 
was established by the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (COPUOS), an intergovernmental body set 
up in 1959 to “encourage continued research and the dis-
semination of information on outer space matters and to study 
legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.” 
Action Team 14, which is composed of both government 
and nongovernment experts, was charged with reviewing 
the ongoing efforts in the field of NEOs, identifying fields 
in which further effort is required, or where other countries/
organizations could contribute, and proposing steps for the 
improvement of international coordination. The work of AT-14 
continued until 2008 when the team presented a summary of 
the recommendations contained in the report Asteroid Threats: 
A Call for Global Response, prepared by the Association of 
Space Explorers (ASE) (http://www.space-explorers.org).
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Fig. 4.  Lightcurve amplitude vs. spin period for NEAs. Data 
are from the European Asteroid Research Node (EARN) 
database (http://earn.dlr.de/). The data suggest that many 
fast-spinning objects with diameters larger than 300 m 
take on more symmetrical shapes (and thus have smaller 
lightcurve amplitudes), presumably due to restructuring 
caused by spin-induced movement and relocation of mate-
rial in a rubble-pile-like structure with little cohesion. On 
the other hand, many of the asteroids smaller than 300 m 
rotate much faster, implying they must have a somewhat 
cohesive structure.
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Fig. 5.  Rotation period vs. size for NEAs. Data are from 
the EARN database (http://earn.dlr.de/). The “spin barrier” 
for gravity-dominated bodies (spin period ~2 h, diameters 
larger than about 300 m) is shown merging into the disrup-
tion limit (dashed line) of Sánchez and Scheeres (2014) 
for smaller bodies. The plotted disruption limit corresponds 
to a cohesion strength of 25 Pa, which is consistent with 
available data according to Sánchez and Scheeres (2014). It 
should be noted, however, that a higher strength is required 
to enclose the super-fast rotators among smaller (<100-m-
diameter) objects. Thus, the internal strength of many 
smaller NEOs must be greater than that of the larger ones.
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To accelerate the formal processing of the ASE report 
within the UN, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
of COPUOS established a working group at the government 
level for the purposes of formally receiving and assessing the 
recommendations of the report. Subsequently, in the light of 
the ASE/AT-14 recommendations, the focus of AT-14 changed 
to reviewing policies and proposing procedures for handling 
the NEO threat on the international stage. As a direct result 
of the work of AT-14 and the ASE, the establishment of two 
new groups (Fig. 6) was endorsed by the sixty-eighth ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly in December 2013:  the 
IAWN and the SMPAG. The purpose of the IAWN is to link 
together institutions carrying out discovery, monitoring, and 
physical characterization of potentially hazardous NEOs with 
other relevant organizations, and promote an internationally 
recognized clearinghouse to manage NEO observations and 
impact predictions. While some of these functions are already 
covered by existing bodies, such as the Minor Planet Center 
at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, which operates 
under the auspices of the International Astronomical Union, 
the IAWN is intended to enhance cooperation between rel-
evant organizations and to be the UN-mandated international 
portal for accurate and validated information on the NEO 
population, as well as to provide recommendations for com-
munication strategies for governments and other relevant 
bodies in the event of an emerging impact threat. NASA has 
agreed to be the initial coordinator of the IAWN.
The IAWN is also charged with establishing collabora-
tion with international disaster response agencies in order 
to develop emergency plans in response to an impact threat 
in a populated area. NASA sponsored a tabletop exercise 
in April 2013 to simulate an impact on Earth for the U.S. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A further 
impact simulation exercise was held during the Planetary 
Defense Conference in Flagstaff, Arizona, also in 2013 
(Carnelli et al., 2014), at which FEMA participated. A 
scenario in which the probability of impact of a 200–300-
m NEA increased over a period of 15 years was simulated. 
More than 200 exercise participants were allocated to groups 
to take charge of different aspects of mitigation planning 
(e.g., NEO discovery and follow-up, mitigation techniques 
and missions, impact effects, media and risk communica-
tion, launch capability of space agencies, etc.). FEMA and 
NASA have recently established a NEO Impact Working 
Group, to be responsible for reviewing disaster response 
and recommend future exercises. In 2014, ESA also held an 
information meeting and similar tabletop exercise for repre-
sentatives of the European emergency response community. 
Further information meetings involving emergency coordina-
tion agencies, including those of the UN, are planned and 
will help to establish a dialog between the scientific and 
technical impact hazard community and those that would 
be responsible for disaster management in the event of an 
impact emergency.
Fig. 6.  Draft scheme of the organization of NEO impact hazard activities under the auspices of the United Nations. Details 
of the tasks, responsibilities, and funding of the IAWN and SMPAG, and the assignment of mandates to take action in an 
emergency situation, are under discussion at the present time. The vertical dashed arrow represents channels that have 
yet to be formally established. Contacts with civil defense organizations are currently being developed. Present member-
ship of the SMPAG includes space agencies that would be capable of contributing to a spaceborne deflection attempt. 
Kinetic impactor illustration courtesy of ESA-AOES Medialab.
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The SMPAG was established to promote opportunities 
for international collaboration on research and development 
work relating to NEO deflection and to develop a framework, 
timeline, and options for initiating and executing space-
mission-response activities. The SMPAG should also develop 
a set of reference missions, addressing a variety of potential 
NEO impact scenarios and deflection/disruption possibilities, 
to facilitate realistic technical and resource planning. When-
ever a credible impact threat is established by the IAWN, the 
SMPAG is charged with proposing options for spaceborne 
intervention to divert the threatening object. Membership 
in the SMPAG is open to all national space agencies or 
governmental or intergovernmental entities that coordinate 
and fund space activities and are capable of carrying out, or 
contributing to, a spaceborne NEO deflection campaign. The 
first chair of the SMPAG is ESA; the chairmanship will rotate 
around the members at intervals of two years.
Information on the history, development, and status of 
UN activities relating to NEOs and the impact threat is avail-
able from http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/COPUOS/
stsc/wgneo/index.html.
The IAWN and SMPAG are asked to work together on 
recommendations for criteria and thresholds for mitigation 
action, such as notification of a significant impact risk or the 
initiation of observation/mitigation campaigns. Both groups 
are currently still in their infancy and questions regarding 
such details as their ultimate tasks and responsibilities, sched-
ule of activities, etc., are still open at the time of this writing. 
A pressing current concern with regard to the initiatives of the 
UN is financial provision for the tasks involved. The work of 
both the IAWN and SMPAG has to be carried out at no cost 
to the UN budget. Consequently, the states and organizations 
making up the membership of the two UN groups have to 
fund their involvement from their own resources. A model for 
the support of the activities of the groups might be the current 
funding of the NEOShield project by the European Com-
mission. While 11 of NEOShield’s 13 partner organizations 
are from European Union countries, two are from non-EU 
countries, namely Russia and the U.S., but they also receive 
funding from the European Union. Therefore NEOShield 
is a truly international project. Taking the SMPAG, for ex-
ample, statements or “white papers” on future research and 
development requirements in the field could be issued by 
the SMPAG on a regular basis, carrying the authority of the 
UN. Calls for proposals from funding agencies, such as the 
European Commission or national agencies, could refer to the 
SMPAG statements, and proposers could orient their work 
plans accordingly. A plausible vision for the future would 
be coordinated calls for mitigation-related proposals from 
a combination of international and national funding bodies, 
based on the recommendations of the UN-backed groups.
8.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The period since the publication of Asteroids III has seen 
rapid progress in many fields related to impact hazards. Op-
tical search programs benefiting from advances in detector 
technology and sophisticated automated detection routines are 
currently enjoying increased funding from NASA. The rate 
of discovery of NEOs has increased to an average of some 3 
per day and the number of NEOs discovered of all sizes has 
risen from around 2000 at the end of 2002 to some 11,000 
at the time of this writing. While endeavors in the field of 
physical characterization have not kept up with the rate of 
new discoveries, the NEOWISE and ExploreNEO projects 
have provided size and albedo data for many hundreds of 
NEOs and demonstrated the value of spacebased telescopes 
sensitive in the thermal infrared for NEO risk assessment.
Unfortunately, the unanticipated Chelyabinsk event on 
February 15, 2013, has demonstrated that the blast waves 
from even relatively small (diameter ~20 m) asteroids explod-
ing in the atmosphere can cause serious injuries and damage 
to property. Chelyabinsk has also taught us that a potentially 
serious impact can occur with no prior warning if the orbit 
of the NEO happens to be unfavorable for detection from 
the ground.
A number of initiatives suggest that the NEO impact threat 
is attracting increasing attention in political circles not only 
in the U.S. The European Commission funded the NEO- 
Shield project from 2012 to 2015, enabling 13 academic and 
industrial organizations from 6 countries, including the U.S. 
and Russia, to collaborate on investigating NEO physical char- 
acteristics and deflection options. European activities also in-
clude the NEO segment of ESA’s Space Situational Awareness 
program, which is currently under development and includes 
plans to build the “Fly-Eye” telescope system with the aim 
of providing sufficient warning of small impactors to allow 
civil defense measures to be taken. A U.S. project with similar 
aims is the ATLAS system. New groups have been established 
under the auspices of the UN to help to coordinate astro-
nomical NEO survey and characterization activities (IAWN) 
and to advise on deflection-related space mission planning 
(SMPAG). The UN initiatives demonstrate that concern about 
the NEO impact hazard is increasing worldwide.
Despite the encouraging progress made during the past 
decade or so, there is still much to be done before we can 
be confident of our ability to deflect a threatening NEO. Evi-
dence from observations, laboratory impact experiments, and 
theoretical work suggest that NEOs differ widely in the nature 
of their near- surface structure, and the outcome of impulsive 
techniques, such as the kinetic impactor, would be difficult 
to predict in the absence of information on bulk density, 
porosity, tensile strength, etc. While alternative slow-push or 
-pull techniques, such as the gravity tractor, may be suitable 
in certain circumstances, such as keyhole avoidance, it seems 
at present that the most likely scenario in which a deflection 
mission is called for would involve an impulsive technique, 
perhaps together with a combination observer/gravity tractor 
spacecraft to provide reconnaissance data and the opportunity 
to adjust the post-impulse trajectory of the target.
While studies of a number of deflection techniques have 
been carried out, no technique has yet been tested in space 
on a real NEA. In order to minimize the uncertainties in 
the outcome of a deflection mission, it would certainly be 
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prudent to test our concepts and assumptions in experimen-
tal missions to deflect suitable representative NEA targets 
before we are forced to apply deflection technology in a 
hurry in a real impact-prevention scenario.
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